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THE EVER-WIDENING GAP BETWEEN THE SCIENCE
OF ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAWS WHICH GOVERN
THAT TECHNOLOGY
Weldon E. Havins and James J. Dalessio*
Science frees us in many ways ... from the bodily terror which the
savage feels. But she replaces that, in the minds of many, by a
moral terror which is far more overwhelming.'
INTRODUCTION
The rapid advances of artificial reproductive technology ("ART") 2
in the field of medical science provide increasing options to couples
and individuals yearning to conceive a genetically related child.3
While the number of couples and individuals who have utilized ART
to conceive a child has increased dramatically over the last decade, the
law regulating ART has been slow to develop and what law exists
oftentimes appears inadequate.
Take for example surrogacy agreements. Although surrogacy has
become a widely accepted ART technique, only one state, Florida, has
promulgated legislation which distinguishes between "gestational"
and "traditional" surrogacy arrangements, 4 despite the fact that ges-
* Weldon E. Havins is an L.L.M. candidate in Health Law at University of San Diego School
of Law; J.D., University of San Diego School of Law; M.D., Bowman Gray School of Medicine
of Wake Forest University; M.A., Claremont Graduate University; B.A., San Diego State Col-
lege. James J. Dalessio is an Adjunct Professor of Law at California Western School of Law;
J.D., University of San Diego School of Law; B.A., University of California, San Diego.
1. Charles Kingsley, Sermon, The Meteor Shower, Nov. 26, 1866.
2. The ART acronym may also represent "assisted reproductive technology." The terms are
synonymous. The term "artificial" seems more apt than "assisted" because "artificial" implies
something other than the "old fashion" way of reproduction. "Assisted" implies some third
party assistance with copulation, a la whales mating.
3. Depending on the situation, it is possible to have a child genetically related to both the
intended mother and father although a third person, the surrogate, gestates the child. Under
"traditional" surrogacy arrangements, the intended mother is not genetically related to the child
and does not gestate the child. See infra Part II for a complete discussion of these two com-
monly accepted ART techniques.
4. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 1997).
Gestational surrogacy contract.
(1) Prior to engaging in gestational surrogacy, a binding and enforceable gestational
surrogacy contract shall be made between the commissioning couple and the gesta-
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tational surrogacy is clearly distinguishable in law and in biology.5 Ar-
kansas is the only state that has passed legislation providing an
unconditional presumption of validity of traditional surrogacy ar-
rangements. The state's statute concludes that a child born to a surro-
gate mother is the child of the "intended parents" and not that of the
surrogate. 6
tional surrogate. A contract for gestational surrogacy shall not be binding and en-
forceable unless the gestational surrogate is 18 years of age or older and the
commissioning couple are legally married and are both 18 years of age or older.
(2) The commissioning couple shall enter into a contract with a gestational surrogate
only when, within reasonable medical certainty as determined by a physician li-
censed under chapter 458 or chapter 459:
(a) The commissioning mother cannot physically gestate a pregnancy to term;
(b) The gestation will cause a risk to the physical health of the commissioning
mother; or
(c) The gestation will cause a risk to the health of the fetus.
(3) A gestational surrogacy contract must include the following provisions:
(a) The commissioning couple agrees that the gestational surrogate shall be the
sole source of consent with respect to clinical intervention and management of
the pregnancy.
(b) The gestational surrogate agrees to submit to reasonable medical evaluation
and treatment and to adhere to reasonable medical instructions about her pre-
natal health.
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (e), the gestational surrogate agrees to relin-
quish any parental rights upon the child's birth and to proceed with the judicial
proceedings prescribed under s. 742.16.
(d) Except as provided in paragraph (e), the commissioning couple agrees to ac-
cept custody of and to assume full parental rights and responsibilities for the
child immediately upon the child's birth, regardless of any impairment of the
child.
(e) The gestational surrogate agrees to assume parental rights and responsibilities
for the child born to her if it is determined that neither member of the commis-
sioning couple is the genetic parent of the child.
As part of the contract, the commissioning couple may agree to pay only reasonable
living, legal, medical, psychological, and psychiatric expenses of the gestational surro-
gate that are directly related to prenatal, intrapartal, and postpartal periods.
5. See infra Part VII for a complete discussion of gestational and traditional surrogacy
agreements.
6. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1998).
Child born to married or unmarried woman-Presumptions-Surrogate mothers.
(a) Any child born to a married woman by means of artificial insemination shall be
deemed the legitimate natural child of the woman and the woman's husband if the
husband consents in writing to the artificial insemination.
(b) A child born by means of artificial insemination to a woman who is married at the
time of the birth of the child shall be presumed to be the child of the woman giving
birth and the woman's husband, except in the case of a surrogate mother, in which
event the child shall be that of:
(1) The biological father and the woman intended to be the mother if the biologi-
cal father is married; or
(2) The biological father only if unmarried; or
(3) The woman intended to be the mother in cases of a surrogate mother when an
anonymous donor's sperm was utilized for artificial insemination.
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Other states' laws upholding traditional surrogacy arrangements
condition contract validity on the surrogate mother being unpaid and/
or the non-gestating "mother" being "infertile."'7 As written, such
laws may not apply to gestational surrogacy arrangements because the
intended mother may be "fertile" to the extent that she can now do-
nate her ovum which, when in vitro fertilized with her husband's
sperm, can be placed into the uterus of a genetically unrelated woman
to incubate (gestate) the embryo.8 Many states have passed legisla-
tion which generally denies the enforcement of surrogacy arrange-
ments.9 It is altogether unclear whether such legislation includes the
distinguishable gestational surrogacy contracts.
The ever-increasing gap between ART and the field of medical sci-
ence, on the one hand, and the lack of any consistent regulation of
that science, on the other hand, is also evident in many other tech-
niques of ART besides surrogacy.10 For example, lawmakers and the
courts have struggled to define, with any consistency, the legal rights
(c) (1) A child born by means of artificial insemination to a woman who is unmarried
at the time of the birth of the child shall be, for all legal purposes, the child of
the woman giving birth, except in the case of a surrogate mother, in which
event the child shall be that of:
(A) The biological father and the woman intended to be the mother if the
biological father is married; or
(B) The biological father only if unmarried; or
(C) The woman intended to be the mother in cases of a surrogate mother when
an anonymous donor's sperm was utilized for artificial insemination.
(2) For birth registration purposes, in cases of surrogate mothers, the woman giv-
ing birth shall be presumed to be the natural mother and shall be listed as such
on the certificate of birth, but a substituted certificate of birth may be issued
upon orders of a court of competent jurisdiction.
7. Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Virginia statutes specifically provide that unpaid
surrogacy contracts are lawful and enforceable. All require that the intended mother must be
infertile. Additionally, New Hampshire and Virginia require advance judicial approval of the
surrogacy agreement and limit who may act as a surrogate. For a complete discussion of these
statutes, see infra Part VII.C. As noted, because of the distinction between gestational and
traditional surrogacy, it is unclear whether courts would apply such legislation to gestational
arrangements.
8. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the biology of ART, including definitions of embryo.
9. Arizona, District of Columbia, Indiana, Michigan, New York, North Dakota, and Utah
deny enforcement of all surrogacy contracts. Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, and Washington
deny enforcement only if the surrogate is to be compensated. For a complete discussion, see
infra Part VII.C.
10. This schism likely results at least in part from the difficult philosophical issues that arise
when infertile couples and individuals turn to ART to procreate. For example, gestational surro-
gacy raises serious philosophical, and ultimately legal issues, regarding who is deemed to be the
"mother" of the child: the woman who provided the ovum, e.g., the "genetic mother," or the
woman who gestates the child, e.g., the "gestational" or "birth" mother. Such issues also arise
when legislatures and courts determine the legal status afforded an embryo, as noted. See infra
Part VII for a complete discussion of this issue.
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afforded an embryo. Generally that determination turns on whether
the embryo is considered merely property, 1 or afforded rights of a
person, 12 or something in between. 13 No state legislation has been
promulgated concerning rights governing embryo adoption, 14 and
only one state has passed laws regulating embryo destruction.' 5
This Article will critically examine the current status of the law as
applied to the present ART techniques. Part I briefly reviews consti-
tutional cases affecting a person's right to "beget a child"' 6 and the
status of ART regulation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 with its pertinent amendments and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990.17 Part II discusses ART's biological elements and
procedures; defines gametes, zygotes, embryos, and the fetus; and
briefly describes the procedures of artificial insemination and in vitro
fertilization. 18 Part III reviews the legal status of gametes and the
products of fertilization, zygotes, and embryos. 19 Part IV examines
the law governing disputes over the control and ownership of cry-
opreserved embryos.20 Part V analyzes gender or sex selection of off-
spring.21 Part VI analyzes the regulation of persons conducting in
vitro fertilization, ART, embryo research, the use of embryos for
11. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 428 (E.D. Va. 1989). See infra Part III.C for a complete
discussion of this case.
12. The state of Louisiana declares that embryos are "persons" within the meaning of the law
unless an in vitro fertilized ovum "fails to develop further over a thirty-six hour period," unless
cryopreserved. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:121-130 (West 1991).
13. Rejecting both the property and person characterizations of embryos, many states have
adopted the "special respect" status announced by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis v.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596 (Tenn. 1992).
14. Although no states have sought to regulate embryo donation for adoption, one New
Jersey couple was fortunate enough to have triplets as a result of this occurrence. Dateline NBC:
Ready Made; New Jersey Couple Has Triplets Through Embryo Adoption (NBC television
broadcast, Sept. 14, 1998) [hereinafter Dateline].
15. The state of Louisiana has provided the destruction of frozen embryos to be unlawful. See
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 1991). Instead, the control over the frozen embryo vests in
the physician in charge of in vitro fertilization as the temporary guardian of the embryo, if the
parents do not assume that responsibility. Id. § 126. This involuntary "control" of the embryo
continues until either adoptive implantation occurs or the court appoints a curator on behalf of
the embryo who then decides the fate of the embryo. Id.
16. "Beget a child" was the term used by United States Supreme Court Justice Brennan, writ-
ing for the majority, in his perspicacious opinion in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
The Court's holding formally encompassed an individual's birth control decisions "as to whether
to bear or beget a child" to be within the fundamental right of privacy penumbra freeing those
decisions from unwarranted governmental intrusion. Id.
17. See infra Part I.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V.
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clinical research, and the disposition and sale of embryos. 22 Part VII
reviews the status of surrogacy contracts and the controversies sur-
rounding the determination of legal parenthood in traditional and
non-traditional surrogacy.23 This Article concludes that it is not the
science itself, but rather how, if at all, that science should be regulated
which poses the greatest challenge associated with ART. As a result,
the Authors believe that uniform legislation should be developed
which, at a minimum, encompasses the scientific advancements made
in ART and regulates that science accordingly.
I. PROCREATION CONSTITUTIONAL AND FEDERAL
STATUTORY RIGHTS
A. Constitutional Protections
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the federal circuit
courts24 have decided a case involving a state's ability to restrict or
otherwise regulate ART, or whether such regulation would pass mus-
ter under the Constitution. Arguably a person's right to use ART to
procreate is rooted in the Constitution. 25 The first United States
Supreme Court case to judicially recognize a constitutional right to
procreate was Skinner v. Oklahoma26 in 1942. The Court stated that
marriage and procreation are basic civil rights of man.27 The Court
also declared procreation to be a fundamental right essential to the
existence and survival of the race.28
Later, the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird29 held that a fundamental
right of privacy regarding birth control decisions exists under the pe-
numbra of the Bill of Rights and "liberty" in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.30 This fundamental right is the "right of the individual
... to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child."'31 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan's sagacious
22. See infra Part VI.
23. See infra Part VII.
24. One federal district court has discussed whether a constitutional right to artificial repro-
duction exists. See Cameron v. Board of Educ., 795 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
25. All cases involving constitutional rights to procreate have involved coital reproduction.
26. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
27. Id. at 541.
28. Id. at 542.
29. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
30. Id. at 453-54.
31. Id. at 453.
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use of the word "beget" likely foresaw the oncoming scientific ad-
vances in reproductive medicine.32
In 1973, the Court's decision of Roe v. Wade33 revolutionized
women's privacy rights. The holding constitutionally protected a
woman's right to determine whether to terminate her pregnancy. 34
The Roe first trimester strict scrutiny standard of review deflected
governmental attempts to restrict a woman's freedom of choice until
Casey v. Planned Parenthood35 in 1992. The majority, written by Jus-
tice O'Connor, held that the strict scrutiny standard of review applied
to the period of non-viability of the fetus.36 After that time, the gov-
ernment's interest in protecting the mother and child was not subject
to the strict scrutiny standard of review. 37
Specifically addressing one aspect of ART, a federal district court in
Ohio observed that "the Supreme Court precedent is clear. A woman
has a constitutional privacy right to control her reproductive func-
tions. Consequently, a woman possesses the right to become pregnant
by artificial insemination. ' 38 Thus, while neither the United States
Supreme Court nor federal circuit courts have directly ruled on a case
involving ART, it appears that such a right does exist under constitu-
tional protections afforded an individual to procreate. As such, any
attempt by the government to intrude or otherwise restrict a person's
access to ART arguably will be limited by the necessity to prove a
compelling governmental interest.
B. Statutory Protections Under the Civil Rights Act and Americans
with Disabilities Act
Congress has promulgated legislation prohibiting discrimination re-
lating to procreation. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("CRA") 39 prohib-
its discrimination in compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, or
sex. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA"), 40 amending
the Civil Rights Act, specifically applied the CRA to women's em-
ployment rights as related to pregnancy.4 1 The PDA protects a
32. Id.
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. Id. at 164-67.
35. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
36. Id. at 867-70.
37. Id. at 869-70.
38. Cameron v. Board of Educ., 795 F. Supp. 228, 237 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000h (1994).
40. Id. § 2000e(k).
41. Id. § 2000(e)(2)(a). Prior to the PDA, the Court held, on Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection grounds, that an employer's health plan that discriminated between pregnant and
830 [Vol. 48:825
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woman's choice to become pregnant while maintaining her position in
the workforce, thereby ensuring equal opportunity in employment.42
As a result, any employer's conduct adversely affecting a woman's
employment status because she chose to undergo possibly time con-
suming (and expensive) artificial reproductive procedures, including
in vitro fertilization, would likely be prohibited under the PDA.
While the language of the statute appears to limit the PDA to
women, 43 it is possible that a court could extend the law to apply to
men desiring ART services, 44 such as men deficient in sperm produc-
tion (low sperm count) or post-vasectomy (who require a re-anasto-
mosis of their previously ligated vas deferens).45
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA")46 prohibits
discrimination in employment and at places of public accommodation
against a person on the basis of his or her disability.47 Under the
ADA, a disability is defined as a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more major life activities. 48 In Bragdon v.
Abbott,49 the United States Supreme Court found infertility consti-
tuted a serious impairment of the "major life activity" of reproduc-
tion.50 Consequently, the Court specifically included infertility as an
ADA recognized disability prohibiting discrimination and requiring
reasonable accommodation.51
Although relatively untested at present, the constitutional and stat-
utory protections applicable to procreation generally will likely also
severely limit any attempted governmental regulation aiming to re-
strict the availability of ART.
non-pregnant women did not violate Title VII of the CRA because the discrimination was not
between men and women. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974). A similar holding two
years later prompted Congress to begin work on the PDA bill. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2)(a).
43. See id. The statute uses the feminine pronoun exclusively.
44. This would be an issue of first impression as there are no reported cases discussing
whether the PDA applies to men. Moreover, there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest
that Congress intended men to be covered by the PDA. However, given the policy of the
PDA-preventing discrimination in employment based on a woman's choice to become preg-
nant-it is possible that the "spirit" of the legislation could be applied to men.
45. Just as a woman's fallopian tubes may be interrupted by ligation or by removing a segment
of the tube ("tube tying"), a male may have a portion of the tube serving as a conduit for sperm
from his testicles to his penis (vas deferens) ligated, including removing a segment. If a male
later desires to have children, his vas deferens can be reconnected or re-anastomosed.
46. 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
47. Id. § 12101(b).
48. Id. § 12102(2).
49. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
50. Id. at 2205.
51. Id.
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II. TERMS AND PROCEDURES OF ART
A. The Biology of ART
Before analyzing the various legal issues related to ART, it is im-
portant to understand the medical technology associated with ART.
Indeed, any hope of achieving consistency in the regulation of ART
will require, at a minimum, generally accepted definitions of the biol-
ogy of ART.
A "gamete" is a sex reproduction cell containing one-half (a hap-
loid) of the forty-six chromosomes contained in all other human body
cells.5 2 Gametes are either a spermatozoa (or sperm,53 for short) or
ova (or eggs). 54
One sperm fertilizes one ovum. The result of this cellular fusion is a
single cell known as a "zygote. ' 55 The zygote contains forty-six chro-
mosomes with half of the genetic contents from the genetic female ova
and half of its genes from the male sperm. The zygote proceeds to
multiply by cellular replication. Implantation into the wall of the
uterus normally occurs four to six days after fertilization. 56
If fertilization is accomplished outside the body (in vitro fertiliza-
tion), the cellular mass is cultured until it reaches the eight cell stage
(about seventy-two hours after fertilization). 57 At this point, the cel-
lular structure (now called a blastomere) may be placed into a uterus
or into a fallopian tube in hopes that it will implant into the uterine
wall and continue developing. 58
Alternatively, at the eight cell stage, the blastomere can be frozen in
liquid nitrogen. 59 If frozen, the mass is generically termed a frozen
embryo. The frozen embryo can later be thawed and placed into a
fallopian tube or into a uterus to enable implantation and develop-
ment into a human fetus. The process of development within the
uterus (or womb) is known as gestation.
52. MILLER-KEANE ENCYCLOPEDIA & DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING & ALLIED
HEALTH 593 (5th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MILLER-KEANE].
53. Just as the plural of sheep is sheep, the plural of sperm is sperm. However, the plural of
ovum is not ovum or ovums, it is ova. Id. at 1805.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1639.
56. See generally Richard J. Paulson, Human In Vitro Fertilization and Related Assisted Repro-
ductive Techniques, in INFERTILITY CONTRACEPTION & REPRODUCTIVE ENDOCRINOLOGY 807
(Daniel R. Mishell, M.D. et al. eds., 3d ed. 1991) (offering results of ART studies).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. The blastomere is also generically referred to as an embryo or pre-embyo.
[Vol. 48:825
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Medical nomenclature changes from an eight cell blastomere to a
cystic blastocoele 60 and then to an embryo. Biologically the blasto-
coele becomes an embryo when a condensation of cells, known as the
"primitive streak" appears; the primitive streak develops about ten to
twelve days after fertilization.61
When the developing embryo reaches a crown-rump length of five
centimeters (roughly two inches), it weighs approximately eight
grams. 62 This occurs at the end of the eighth week when the embryo
has developed into a fetus. 63
B. The Procedures of ART
Procedures of ART include: artificial insemination, in vitro fertiliza-
tion ("IVF"), and pre-implantation surgeries known as GIFT, ZIFT,
and TET.64 Artificial insemination is the placement of semen (sperm)
into the uterus opening (cervix or cervical opening) using a tube con-
duit (cannula). 65 This semen may be fresh (ejaculate) or may be from
previously frozen and recently thawed semen.66 The sperm cells in the
semen travel up through the uterus and into the fallopian tubes where
fertilization occurs. The fertilized ovum, now a zygote, floats back
down the fallopian tube into the uterus, where it implants into the
uterine wall.
IVF67 literally means "fertilization in a glass." IVF is accomplished
by combining sperm and an ovum in a petri dish where fertilization
60. Id. A cystic blastocoele is a fluid-filled area with the cellular mass. Id. The blastomere
develops into a blastocyst and then into a blastocoele. See id. for a complete discussion of the
science of ART.
61. This primitive streak develops into three layers known as the endoderm, mesoderm, and
ectoderm. WALDO NELSON, THE NELSON TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRICs 30-33 (Richard E.
Behrman et al. eds., 15th ed. 1996). A portion of the ectoderm invaginates into a tubular struc-
ture known as the neural tube. Id. Imperfect neural tube formation can be variously expressed
at birth as anything from exposed neural tissue, such as spinal cord elements, to a small bony
defect in a spine bone, known as spondylolithisis. Id. Neural tube defects are suspected when a
pregnant mother's blood tests positive for alpha-feto protein. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. An embryo becomes a fetus at the end of the eighth week. The crown-rump length is
five centimeters, the weight is about eight grams. At this stage the eyelids have begun to form,
ovaries and testicles are distinguishable, and the arms and legs have distinct fingers and toes.
64. Paulson, supra note 56, at 820.
65. See Michael J. Kirby, Medical Technology and New Frontiers of Family Law in Legal Is-
sues, in HUMAN REPRODUCTION 3 (Sheila McLean ed., 1989).
66. Semen (sperm with its supporting fluids from the prostate, Cowper's glands, and seminal
vesicles) may be frozen in liquid nitrogen and stored for many years. This frozen storage capac-
ity has made possible the industry of "sperm banks" where both donated sperm, for sale, and
personal sperm frozen for some future use. See MILLER-KEANE, supra note 52, at 793.
67. "In vitro fertilization" means fertilization outside the body. Id. "In vivo fertilization"
means fertilization within life or, as applied here, within the body. Id. See generally John D.
Biggers, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer in Historical Perspective, in IN VITRO FERTIL-
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occurs. When the nuclei (actually called pro-nuclei) of the sperm and
the ovum have fused, a zygote has formed. This zygote may be placed
into the fallopian tube using an abdominal laparoscope, a procedure
known as ZIFT.68 TET is a procedure where an embryo, fresh or
thawed, is placed into the fallopian tube through an abdominal
laparoscope. 69 Most commonly, direct embryo insertion is performed
wherein the embryo is inserted through the cervix into the uterus us-
ing a cannula, just as is sperm in artificial insemination. The direct
procedure does not involve an anesthetic and has almost none of the
infection risk which accompany laparoscopic procedures.
III. EMBRYOS AS PROPERTY, PERSONS, OR "SOMETHING
IN BETWEEN"
Although federal law appears to recognize an infertile woman's
right to procreate using ART,70 it is less than clear what rights, if any,
fertilized (combined) gametes (i.e., those potentially capable of devel-
oping into human beings) enjoy under the law. On one level, the
"building blocks" of an embryo, gametes (e.g., sperm and ova), are
treated as mere "property" under the law.71 As a consequence,
"donated" sperm relieves the male donor of all rights and responsibili-
ties for subsequent use. 72 Unless the donation involves a third party
intermediary like a sperm bank, however, a question may arise as to
whether providing the semen specimen included the intent to relin-
quish all parental rights. For example, a California statute provides
that the donor of semen supplied to a licensed physician for use in
artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby
conceived. 73 In a case where the semen specimen provided directly to
a woman for her self-administered artificial insemination, the semen
IZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER 3 (Alan Trounson & Carl Wood eds., 1984) (providing
history).
68. See Paulson, supra note 56, at 820. ZIFT is an acronym for zygote intrafallopian tube
transfer. Id.
69. See id. TET is an eponym for tubal embryo transfer.
70. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
71. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993).
72. See generally McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1994) (divorce pro-
ceeding holding wife as natural mother even though she did not provide eggs in IVF procedure).
Donation implies an intention to relinquish all rights to the thing donated. For example, when
one donates blood, one relinquishes all rights and claims to any further use of that donated
blood. Donation should not be confused with provision or providing. Providing sperm to an end
user does not, in and of itself, relinquish rights to the product of that use. Hence, a male provid-
ing a semen specimen to a lady friend so that she may self-inseminate does not sever the male's
rights to a paternity claim, including visitation of his genetic offspring.
73. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 1994).
[Vol. 48:825
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provider was granted paternity rights for the resulting child.74 The
court held that the woman's failure to utilize a physician intermediary,
as provided by statute, precluded her claim for exclusive parental
rights. 75
A. Liability of a Sperm Bank
A sperm bank exemplifies the classic third party intermediary. 76
Although frozen sperm may be stored by the owner for possible fu-
ture use, more commonly the sperm bank pays the sperm donor to
provide a specimen which then becomes the property of the sperm
bank.7 7 The donor signs a contract relinquishing all rights to the
sperm. The sperm may be cryopreserved for future commercial sale
by the sperm bank.
The sperm bank is liable for negligence for mistakes made in rec-
ord-keeping when a recipient receives semen which is not that of the
purported donor. 78 In addition, the question of whether the commer-
cial provider of the sperm is also liable for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress caused by insemination with semen not selected by the
recipient was answered in Harnicher v. University of Utah Medical
Center.79 The court in that case held as a matter of law that, because
no physical injury occurred to the wife or child, no negligent infliction
of emotional distress cause of action could lie.80
The question of whether cryopreserved semen could be the subject
of a devise in a will was litigated in 1993.81 A divorced attorney with
two adult children committed suicide and devised his cryopreserved
semen to his girlfriend, accompanied by a letter indicating his inten-
tion that she produce his posthumous offspring.82 The court held the
frozen sperm to be the decedent's "property" and thus, subject to tes-
tamentary disposition.8 3 In so doing, the probate court specifically
74. Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986).
75. Id.
76. For information on sperm banks, see California Cryobank, Inc.'s website (visited on Sept.
22, 1998) <http://www.cryobank.com>.
77. Commercial sperm donors provide extensive information on personal medical and family
medical history which is made available to potential purchasers.
78. Harnicher v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 71-72.
81. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993). The probate court com-
mented that "we are all agreed that we are forging new frontiers because science has run ahead
of the common law. And we have got to have some sort of appellate decision telling us what
rights are in these uncharted territories." Id. at 280 n.3. This sentiment must be very common
today in courts addressing the legal issues raised by all expanding scientific frontiers.
82. Id. at 277.
83. Id. at 283.
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recognized that it was "forging new frontiers because science has run
ahead of the common law."'84 The court also added it needed "some
sort of appellate decision telling us what rights are in these uncharted
territories."85
B. Ova "Banks": Now a Technological Possibility
Until recently, ova extracted from the ovaries required immediate
fertilization because storage was not technically possible.8 6 When im-
planted into the same woman's uterus (such as might occur in a
woman with obstructed fallopian tubes), the woman would necessarily
be the genetic mother and the gestational mother (the birth mother).
Where the ovum is obtained by a another woman, fertilized by sperm
of the intended father, and implanted into the wife, the wife is the
gestational/birth mother but not the genetic mother.
The latter situation presented itself in McDonald v. McDonald,87 a
New York divorce and custody dispute. In McDonald, the ovum was
obtained from another woman, fertilized with the husband's sperm,
and implanted into the wife's uterus.88 The husband claimed that, be-
cause the wife was not genetically related to the child, she was not the
mother and therefore not entitled to custody or visitation rights.89
The court held that, because the ovum was "donated," any rights or
claims of the genetic mother were severed.90 Because a child can only
have one legal mother, the gestational mother (the soon to be former
wife) was held to be the natural and legal mother, entitled to custody
and visitation rights equal to those of the father.91 Essential to the
holding was the court's finding of "donation" of the ovum by the egg
provider. 92
Thus, in the past gamete cryopreservation had been limited to
sperm. Now elective cryopreservation of ova provides the ovulating
84. Id. at 280 n.3.
85. Id.
86. Two scientific articles published in early 1998 demonstrated that cryopreservation of the
human ovum for later thawing and in vitro fertilization had become a practical reality. Laura
Bonetta, Postponing Pregnancy by Freezing Oocytes, 4 NAT. MED. (no. 2) 138 (1998); Kutluck
Oktay, M.D. et al., Cryopreservation of Immature Human Oocytes and Ovarian Tissue: An
Emerging Technology?, 69 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1 (1998); E. Young et al., Triplet Pregnancy
After Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection of Cryopreserved Ooctyes: Case Report, 70 FERTILITY &
STERILITY (no. 2) 360 (1998).
87. 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1994).
88. Id. at 478.
89. Id. at 479. No state permits a child to have more than one legal mother (and one legal
father).
90. Id. at 480.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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female the option of cryopreserving her eggs for her own future use or
donating the frozen eggs for another's use. The procedure portends
the establishment of ova banks where consumers can select preferred
maternal phenotypes,93 just as consumers currently choose between
desired sperm donor phenotypes.
C. Embryos
While male and female gametes are considered property, zygotes
and embryos can be considered property, persons, or something in
between property or persons. The classification applied will govern
the viability of ART contracts 94 and the rights of ownership and con-
trol of the fate of the embryo.
For example, in one case a California couple went to a Virginia fer-
tility clinic where several of the wife's ova were fertilized with the
husband's sperm.95 Two attempts at implantation were unsuccessful,
and the remainder of the embryos were cryopreserved. 96 Later the
couple sought to have the frozen embryos transferred to a California
fertility clinic for possible future implantation. 97 The Virginia fertility
clinic refused to transfer the couple's frozen embryos.98 The court
held the frozen embryos to be the "property" of the couple. 99 As
their property, the court ruled the couple had a right to have the em-
bryos transferred. 100
This holding sustains the American Fertility Society's ethical state-
ment on IVF that embryos are the "property" of the gamete provid-
ers.10 1 As such, the property owners had the right to decide, at their
sole discretion, the disposition of their property.
The only state to pass legislation attempting to regulate the legal
rights provided to embryos is Louisiana. 10 2 It declares that embryos
are "persons" entitled to all the usual protections of any "juridical
93. A phenotype is the term used to describe genetic expression in a person. See MILLER-
KEANE, supra note 52, at 1146. Because an individual's actual genotype is not known, all that is
available is a description of the expression of that genetic constituency such as hair color, height,
weight, race, etc. See id.
94. See infra Part VII.
95. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 423-24 (E.D. Va. 1989).
96. Id. at 420.
97. Id. at 424.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 425.
100. Id. at 426-27.
101. American Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertilization, 41 FERTILITY & STE-
RILrry (no. 1) 12 (1984).
102. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:121-130 (West 1991). Thus, the only time an embryo can be
discarded is when it shows no signs of life at 36 hours after fertilization. Id. § 9:129. At this time,
no cases have been published interpreting this statutory scheme.
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person" unless an "in vitro fertilized human ovum that fails to develop
further over a thirty-six hour period except when the embryo is in a
state of cryopreservation. '' 10 3 Specifically, the statute states that the
fertilized human ovum is deemed to be a biological human being
"which is not the property of the physician which acts as an agent of
fertilization, or the facility which employs him or the donors of the
sperm and ovum. ' 10 4 If the IVF gamete providers renounce, "by no-
tarial act," their parental rights for in utero implantation, the embryo
thereby becomes available for adoption.10 5 In this circumstance, the
physician becomes the temporary guardian of the embryo "person. 10 6
The physician's responsibility to safeguard the embryo is only relieved
by the court appointing a "curator" to guard the interests of the em-
bryo awaiting adoption.10 7
Rejecting both the property and person characterizations of em-
bryos, many jurisdictions have adopted the "special respect" status ac-
corded embryos by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis.10 8
The court concluded that "pre-embryos"' 0 9 are not, strictly speaking,
either persons or property, but occupy an interim category that enti-
tles them to special respect because of their potential for human
life." 0 The gamete providers have an ownership interest in that they
have decision-making authority concerning disposition of the em-
bryos, within the scope of the applicable law.11 This position appears
to give courts of equity maximum flexibility in deciding the difficult
issues of, among others, ownership and disposition of embryos.
IV. LIABILITY RESULTING FROM THE CONTROL AND OWNERSHIP
OF CRYOPRESERVED EMBRYOS
The potential liability resulting from the control and ownership of
embryos may turn on the legal status afforded to an embryo. For ex-
ample, if an embryo is treated as mere property, the gamete providers
perhaps may have a cause of action for conversion for the mishandling
of the embryo. If, on the other hand, the embryo is deemed a person,
there may be a cause of action for injury or destruction of the embryo
103. Id.
104. Id. § 9:126.
105. Id. § 9:130.
106. Id. § 9:126.
107. Id.
108. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
109. Biologically, this is a correct term because the organism has not developed the primary
streak which characterizes the embryo. Most courts use the more generic term embryo to mean
an organism greater than the four cell stage and less than a fetus.
110. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
111. Id.
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under the same common law theory as damages for mishandling the
body of a close relative.
Some courts appear to avoid the issue altogether. In one case, a
Virginia couple brought a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress when their newly created embryos were washed
with an albumin solution contaminated with the virus of Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease. 112 An FDA letter directing withdrawal of the albumin
had been overlooked by the IVF clinic.113 Washing the embryos in
the contaminated albumin rendered the embryos unusable.1 14 The
district court held that, because the plaintiffs themselves had not sus-
tained physical injury, there was no cause of action for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress.115
Other courts have recognized a cause of action for emotional dis-
tress for the mishandling or destruction of embryos. Indeed, the first
purported attempt in the United States at IVF and embryo freezing
occurred in the early 1970s at no less a prestigious institution than
Columbia Presbyterian Hospital in New York.116 Believing that IVF
was unethical and immoral, the department chair unilaterally de-
stroyed the embryo when he learned of the planned implantation. 117
He did this on his own initiative and without notice or consultation
with the couple or the doctors involved. 118 A year later, the couple
sued the department chair and Columbia Presbyterian for intentional
infliction of emotional distress."l 9 This ignominious inauguration of
frozen embryo IVF in the United States resulted in the jury awarding
the couple $500,000 in damages.' 20
Oftentimes embryos become the subject of dispute between the two
gamete providers. Two state supreme courts have ruled on the owner-
ship and control of cryopreserved human embryos in divorce settings.
In 1992, the custody of the frozen embryos of Junior and Mary Sue
Davis was decided by the Tennessee Supreme Court.' 2 ' The court
held that, absent prior agreement of the embryos' disposition, the
male gamete provider had equal rights to determine the fate of the
112. Doe v. Irvine Scientific Sales Co., 7 F. Supp. 2d 737, 738 (1998).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 738.
115. Id. at 741.
116. Del Zio v. Columbia Presbyterian Med. Ctr., No. 74 Civ. 3588 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978)
(on file with Authors).
117. Id. at 3.
118. Id. at 4.
119. Id. at 5.
120. See Deborah Kay Walther, "Ownership" of the Fertilized Ovum In Vitro, 26 FAM. L.Q.
235, 240 (1992) (discussing the Del Zio case).
121. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
couple's frozen embryos. 122 The court reasoned that the male gamete
provider husband had no right to demand that their embryo be im-
planted into his wife. 123 Likewise, the female gamete provider had no
right to require the male gamete provider to become a father. 124
While Mary Sue Davis initially had wanted the embryos for her own
future use, by the time the court heard the case she had changed her
mind and professed a desire to donate the embryos for adoption by
another couple. 125 The court weighed Junior Davis' interest in avoid-
ing parenthood against Mary Sue's interest in donating the embryos to
another couple for adoptive implantation. 26 The court concluded
that disputes involving the disposition of embryos produced by IVF
and preserved should first be resolved by the gamete providers. 27
Absent that resolution, their prior agreement should control.'2 8 In the
event that there was no prior agreement, the interests of the parties
should be balanced. 2 9 Assuming the other party has a reasonable
possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than by using the
disputed embryos, the party wishing to avoid procreation should pre-
vail. 130 Thus, Junior Davis was granted ownership and control of the
frozen embryos.' 31
Recently, New York's highest court faced a situation similar to that
in Davis. In Kass v. Kass,132 the former wife demanded sole custody
of five frozen embryos and contended that "these were her only
chance for genetic motherhood."'' 33 The former husband objected to
the burdens of unwanted fatherhood. 134 According to the court, a
woman's constitutional autonomy was implicated only upon preg-
nancy with the implanted embryo. 135 The New York Court of Ap-
peals agreed with the Davis holding that the parties' pre-IVF
agreement controlled. 136 Thus, per this prior written agreement, the
122. Id. at 604.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 590.
126. Id. at 603-04.
127. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603-04.
128. Id. at 604.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 604-05.
132. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
133. Id. at 175.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 177.
136. Id.
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embryos were donated to an IVF program where they could be used
for legitimate research purposes.137
The status of embryos of decedents received notoriety when a Cali-
fornia couple died in a plane crash leaving behind several frozen em-
bryos.138 The couple died intestate, leaving an estate valued at
$8,000,000.139 The Australian government, having jurisdiction over
the embryos, ultimately decided that the embryos could be donated
for adoption without any rights of inheritance.1 40
The California Probate Code is inconsistent with this decision, stat-
ing that "relatives of the decedent conceived before the decedent's
death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the life-
time of the decedent.' 141 An embryo conceived during the decedent's
life but implanted some months or years later would appear to have
the rights of a pretermitted heir.142 This issue has not yet been liti-
gated, but such children resulting from previous frozen embryos ap-
pear to have standing to test the statute.
No state has regulated or proscribed embryo donation for adoption.
Indeed, this has been the source of triplets for one New Jersey
couple.143 The fate of embryos not donated for adoption, but aban-
doned by their progenitors, is less certain. Some scholars believe that
if embryos are considered property, the state laws of abandoned per-
sonal property should apply to determine the fate of the embryos.144
Great Britain assumed governmental control over frozen embryos
when promulgating a law providing for the destruction of abandoned
embryos. 145 The British government announced that 3,000 frozen em-
bryos more than five years old, unclaimed by August 1, 1996, would be
destroyed. 146 Italian doctors offered to purchase and transport these
embryos to Italy for implantation into women willing to receive
137. Id.
138. James Lieber, The Case of the Frozen Embryos, SAT. EVENINO POST, Oct. 1989, at 50.b.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6407 (West 1994).
142. Id.
143. See Dateline, supra note 14.
144. See Lynne M. Thomas, Comment, Abandoned Frozen Embryos and Texas Law of Aban-
doned Personal Property: Should There Be a Connection, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 255, 264 (1997).
145. Human Fertilization and Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37 (Eng.).
146. In the United States, a live birth has occurred from an embryo frozen for seven and one-
half years. See Heesun Wee, "Oldest" Embryo Brought to Life, L. A. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 17,
1998, at N1. A healthy 8 pound, 15 ounce boy was born at a Tarzana hospital to a woman, 44,
and her husband, 54, who asked to remain anonymous to protect their privacy. Id. Not reported
was whether the embryo was genetically theirs or an adopted embryo.
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them.147 The Catholic Church denounced the planned destruction as
a "prenatal massacre."'1 48 On August 1, 1996, the British destroyed
the 3,000 embryos as scheduled. 149 Britain has subsequently amended
its law to require ten years of abandonment mandating embryo de-
struction. 150 However, Britain has not recanted from its position of
governmental control of abandoned embryos. 15'
In contrast, Louisiana has provided the destruction of frozen em-
bryos to be unlawful. 152 Under Louisiana law, the control over the
frozen embryo vests in the IVF physician as the temporary guardian
of the embryo, if the parents do not assume that responsibility. 153
This control and stewardship of the frozen embryo continues until
either adoptive implantation occurs, or the court appoints a "curator"
for the embryo who then controls the fate of the embryo.1 54 Frozen
embryos may not be destroyed under the Louisiana statute. 55
V. GENDER OR SEX SELECTION OF OFFSPRING
Selective pregnancy reduction, a medical procedure used in multi-
ple pregnancies, has been used to select the gender of the fetus
brought to birth. The euphemistic "selective pregnancy reduction"
can more honestly and accurately be labeled sex or gender selection
abortion. 56 There is an intuitive disfavor accompanying this mode of
gender selection. Fortunately, an advance in ART apparently will
render the offensive practice obsolete. Scientists in 1996 published ar-
ticles on the availability of a technique to separate sperm of mammals
into those carrying an X chromosome and those carrying a Y chromo-
some. 157 In February of 1998, a group of Spanish scientists demon-
147. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, Ethical Furor Erupts in Britain: Should Embryos Be Destroyed?,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at Al.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Human Fertilization and Embryology Act Regulations of 1990,1996, ch. 37, § 314 (Eng.).
151. Id.
152. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 1991).
153. Id. § 9:126.
154. Id. § 9:130.
155. Id. § 9:128.
156. Jodi Danis, Sexism and the Superfluous Female: Arguments for Regulating Pre-implanta-
tion Sex Selection, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 219, 219 (1995).
157. D.G. Cran & L.A. Johnson, The Predetermination of Embryonic Sex Using Flow
Cytometrically Separated X and Y Spermatozoa, 2(4) HuM. REPROD. UPDATE 355 (1996); L.A.
Johnson, Gender Preselection in Mammals: An Overview, 103(8-9) DTW DEUTSCH TIERARZTL
WOCHENSCHR 288 (1996). The studies were based on the fact that a sperm with an X chromo-
some contains about 3% more DNA than a sperm with a Y chromosome. Simply, the DNA is
stained with fluorescein dye and separated with the use of a laser light measuring the amount of
DNA, and then separated using flow cytometry and cell sorting instrumentation. Studies in cat-
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strated that the fluorescent in-situ hybridization ("FISH") technique
would produce 80 to 90% purity for X spermatozoa and 60 to 70% for
Y spermatozoa. 58
This remarkable advance resulted in the Genetics and IVF Institute,
based in Fairfax, Virginia, reporting an 85% success rate in selecting
girls (thirteen of fourteen pregnancies) and a slightly lower rate of
success in those desiring male fetuses. 159 One obvious benefit of this
procedure is that it enables parents to avoid having children with sex-
linked or X-linked diseases, such as common hemophilia and a pro-
gressive blindness known as X-linked retinitis pigmentosa, simply by
selecting female offspring. Among the troubling aspects of this new
technique is a strong preference in some cultures for male offspring
and the social disruptions this may engender. The Authors foresee a
plethora of scholarly articles in the near future regarding the ethical
and moral aspects of gender selection using this new ART technology.
VI. REGULATION OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, EMBRYO RESEARCH,
AND THE DISPOSITION AND SALE OF EMBRYOS
A. Federal Regulation
In 1992, the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act be-
came effective. 160 The Act requires ART clinic programs to report
their success rates to the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") by
sending the data through the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices ("HHS"). 161 Standards for reporting pregnancy success rates are
to be established by the CDC.162 In the past, voluntary reporting
often led to exaggerated claims of success. These success rates are to
be made available by the CDC to the general public.163 Thus, the
public desiring ART would have a more accurate prediction of the
chances to obtain a live baby.
Another provision required the CDC to develop a model program
for the certification of IVF laboratories, which could be adopted by
tie and rabbits produced greater than 90% predictability of the desired gender. Studies in pigs
averaged predictions over 85%.
158. F. Vidal et al., Efficiency of MicroSort Flow Cytometry for Producing Sperm Populations
Enriched in X- or Y- Chromosome Haplotypes: A Blind Trial Assessed by Double and Triple
Colour Fluorescent In-situ Hybridization, 13(2) HUM. REPROD. 308 (1998).
159. See Diane Lore, Procedure Lets Couple Pick Sex of Their Child, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Sept. 10, 1998, at 1D.
160. Fertility Clinic Success and Certification Act, 106 Stat. 3146 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 201, 263(a)(1) (1994)).
161. Id. § 263(a)(1)(a).
162. Id. § 263(a)(1)(b).
163. Id.
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each state. 164 Certification would theoretically maximize the quality
of IVF, assure consistent application of established procedures, and
guarantee accurate reporting. Unfortunately, the program lacked im-
plementation funding until 1996, when a mere $1,000,000 was allo-
cated by HHS to the CDC. While the work has begun, to date there
have been no model regulations promulgated or reports of clinic suc-
cess available from the CDC.
Federal funding for embryo research has run onto a regulatory
brick wall. In 1993, the National Institutes of Health Revitalization
Act provided for the elimination of the HHS Ethical Advisory
Board.165 While the Board had specifically concluded that embryo re-
search was theoretically ethical, the National Institute of Health
("NIH") never allocated any funds for embryo research. 166 Elimina-
tion of this Board evidently was a signal to NIH to proceed with fund-
ing embryo research experiments. Ever cautious and politically
prudent, the NIH convened another group of experts, the Human
Embryo Research Panel, consisting of experts in the fields of
medicine, law, ethics, and public policy. 167 On the basis of this panel's
recommendation to fund embryo research (including intentionally
creating embryos solely for research purposes), the Advisory Commit-
tee to the Director of the NIH advised the NIH Director to begin
funding research.1 68 In response, President Clinton directed the NIH
not to allocate any funds for embryo research.' 69 Subsequently, Con-
gress passed Public Law 105-78 statutorily prohibiting the use of fed-
eral funds for embryo research of any kind, including destroyed,
discarded, or otherwise unusable embryos. 70 Thus, while the law
proscribes the use of federal funds for embryo research, there is no
federal legislation regulating embryo research in the private sector.
As a result, whatever benefits are distilled from private sector embryo
164. Id. § 263(a)(2).
165. National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act, 107 Stat. 122 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 8 U.S.C.) (1994).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 289(g).
167. NATIONAL INSTS. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL D-4
(1994) (copies of this report may be obtained by contacting NIH). For a summary on the panel's
findings, see George J. Annas et al., The Politics of Human Embryo Research: Avoiding Ethical
Gridlock, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1329 (1996).
168. R. Alta Charo, The Hunting of the Snark: The Moral Status of Embryos, Right-to-Lifers,
and Third World Women, 62 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 11, 14 (1995).
169. Id. (quoting Statement by the President on NIH Recommendation Regarding Human
Embryo Research, U.S. Newswire, Dec. 2, 1994).
170. Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1998, 111 Stat. 1467 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)
(1997).
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research are likely to cost the American public a great deal more due
to commercial patents.
B. State Regulation
All three of the state statutes criminalizing embryo experimentation
which have been challenged in federal court have been held unconsti-
tutional. The Fifth Circuit examined a Louisiana abortion statute
criminalizing experimentation on any embryo or fetus unless such ex-
periments were therapeutic.171 The court found the terms "experi-
ment" and "therapeutic" to be unconstitutionally vague. 172
The Tenth Circuit reviewed a federal district court decision invali-
dating a Utah statute criminalizing embryo or fetus experimentation
on grounds that the use of the terms "experimentation" and "benefit"
were unconstitutionally vague. 173 Finally, the Northern District of Illi-
nois held the failure to define the term "therapeutic" in the Illinois
statute criminalizing embryo experimentation rendered it unconstitu-
tionally vague.' 74
Subsequently, Louisiana 75 and Pennsylvania 176 passed laws crim-
inalizing embryo experimentation, all containing more specific defini-
tions of the terms previously declared vague. North Dakota 77 and
Rhode Island 178 both maintain statutes criminalizing aspects of em-
bryo experimentation. These statutes have not been subject to federal
court constitutional challenges.
Florida, 79 Massachusetts, 80 Michigan,18' and Minnesota 182 ban
non-therapeutic embryo research. New Hampshire explicitly limits
the maintenance of non-frozen embryos outside the uterus to fourteen
days and prohibits the transfer of research embryos to a uterine
cavity.' 83
171. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986).
172. Id. at 999.
173. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493, 1506 (10th Cir. 1995).
174. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1376 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
175. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (West 1991).
176. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (West 1983 & Supp. 1998).
177. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-01 (1997).
178. R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-54-1 (1994).
179. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(6) (West Supp. 1999).
180. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J (West 1996).
181. MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 333.2685 (West 1992).
182. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West 1998).
183. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15 (1994).
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Seven states and the District of Columbia specifically prohibit the
sale of embryos.184 Georgia permits payment for embryos to be used
for health services education. 185 Michigan 186 and Rhode Island187
prohibit payment for unlawfully used or transferred embryos. Four
other states specifically prohibit the sale of embryos for research
purposes.188
The regulation of ART has been lax, consistent with an apparent
fundamental procreation "right of access" to ART. The United States
Supreme Court has not yet ruled whether procreational privacy rights
extend to the non-coital procedures of ART. Assuming these rights
apply to non-coital reproduction, one would expect the Supreme
Court to extend the onerous strict scrutiny standard of review to gov-
ernmental regulation.
Few states have attempted general regulation of ART. The most
benign attempt is Pennsylvania's requirement that ART clinics file re-
ports on the number of personnel employed, and the number of eggs
fertilized, implanted, and discarded at any given clinic site. 189 Vir-
ginia' 90 and Massachusetts require written informed consents signed
by ART patients before ART can be undertaken. 19' These consents
must contain information specifying the success rates of the particular
clinic.192
C. Industry Self-Regulation
Self-regulation has occurred primarily through the American Soci-
ety for Reproductive Medicine. 93 This organization developed labo-
ratory guidelines and clinical standards which members are expected,
but not required, to follow.194 Membership, as well as adherence to
184. D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2601(b) (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 873.05(1)-(3) (West 1997); 755
ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/8.1 (West 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (West 1991); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 145.422(3) (West 1998); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216(b)(3) (West Supp. 1998); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 48.02 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-311 (1995); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 32.1-289.1 (Michie 1997).
185. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-160(b)(5) (1996).
186. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2690 (West 1992).
187. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54 1(f) (1994).
188. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992); MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 112,
§ 12(J)(a)(IV) (1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.10204(1); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-
02(4) (1997).
189. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(e) (West 1983).
190. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2971.1 (Michie 1998).
191. H.B. 2863, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997).
192. Id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2971.1 (Michie 1998).
193. American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Statement on Regulation of ART (Nov.
17, 1995).
194. Id.
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the promulgated guidelines, is voluntary. 195 The director of the CDC,
Dr. William Roper, testified that 90% of clinics were voluntarily re-
porting their success rates as of 1991.196 However, the system lacks an
audit mechanism assuring the accuracy of reported data.1 97
VII. SURROGACY
A. Traditional Surrogacy Contracts
Traditional surrogacy involves a contract between an infertile
couple (H and W, for example) and a fertile woman (surrogate). 198 In
the traditional surrogacy contract, the surrogate agrees to be insemi-
nated with H's sperm and to carry the pregnancy to term. After the
birth of the baby, the surrogate promises to relinquish all rights to the
baby, transfer the baby to H and W, and facilitate W's adoption of the
baby. 199 For this, all the surrogate's expenses are paid by H and W in
addition to a fee for the surrogate's services. These traditional surro-
gate contracts have not been well received by the common law courts.
In 1988, In re Baby M, 2 00 was the first case to reach a state supreme
court. In this case, the court was asked to determine the validity of a
contract providing a new way to bring a child into a family. 201 In addi-
tion to expenses, the surrogacy contract provided for a fee of $10,000
for the woman's services. 20 2 For this consideration, the woman prom-
ised to be inseminated with the contracting party husband's sperm and
to carry the conceived child to birth.20 3 She promised to then deliver
195. Id.
196. Fertility Clinic Services: Hearing on H.R. 3940 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong. 1, 17 (1992) (statement of Dr.
William Roper, Director, CDC).
197. Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 34 Hous.
L. REV. 609, 637-38 (1997); Jean M. Eggen, The "Orwellian Nightmare" Reconsidered: A Pro-
posed Regulatory Framework for the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L. REV. 625,
667 (1991).
198. Surrogacy origin dates back as far as Genesis. Sarah, Abraham's infertile wife, directs
him to "go into my maid," Hagar, so that Sarah "may found a family through her." Genesis 16:2.
Thereby, Hagar became the first documented surrogate. What did Hagar have to say about this?
We do not know.
The second documented surrogate was Rachel's slave Bilhah. Infertile Rachel encouraged her
husband Jacob to "lie with [Bilhah], so that she may bear sons to be laid upon my knees, and
through her I too may build up a family." Id. 30:3-5.
From these early surrogacy arrangements, exploitation of surrogates has been suspect. How-
ever, is there exploitation of the surrogate as a woman or exploitation of the surrogate as a slave
that is the dominant concern?
199. Here the sperm provider is the undisputed father of the child.
200. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
201. Id. at 1234.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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the child to the husband-father, and assist with any formalities of
adoption by the wife. 204 After the child was born, however, the gesta-
tional mother refused to honor the contract and demanded custody of
the child.205 The husband and wife sued for specific enforcement of
the contract. 206
The trial court held that the New Jersey statutes governing adop-
tion, termination of parental rights, and the prohibition of the pay-
ment of money in connection with adoption did not apply to surrogacy
contracts. 20 7 The trial court also held the surrogacy contract valid and
ordered specific performance of the contract.20 8 The trial court
granted the husband sole custody of the child,209 severed parental
rights of the surrogate, and granted adoption of the child by the
wife. 210
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed.211 The court
invalidated the surrogacy contract, holding that it conflicted with the
same laws the trial court found inapplicable. 212 Furthermore, the
court held that the payment of money to a surrogate mother was ille-
gal, contrary to public policy, and potentially "degrading to
women. '' 213 While the court granted custody to the father, it voided
the mother's parental rights, the wife's adoption of the child, and de-
clared the surrogate to be the child's natural and legal mother.21 4 The
court, however, stated that where a woman "voluntarily and without
payment agrees to act as a surrogate, provided she is not subject to a
binding agreement to surrender her child, no New Jersey law is
offended." 215
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1237.
206. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1237.
207. In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128, 1157-58 (N.J. Super. 1987).
208. Id. at 1166.
209. The trial court found, among others, the following facts: The surrogate party fled the
state with the baby to avoid service of process, lived in 20 different motels and homes in the next
three months to avoid prosecution, threatened to kill herself, kill the child, and falsely accused
the husband of sexually molesting the surrogate's other daughter. Id.
210. Id. at 1175.
211. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1234.
214. Id. at 1235.
215. Id. Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Virginia have adopted statutes wherein un-
paid surrogacy contracts are explicitly enforceable, although New Hampshire requires advance
judicial approval of the agreement and even then permits the surrogate to opt out of the agree-
ment within 72 hours of the birth of the child. See infra notes 334-39 and accompanying text.
Virginia requires the intended mother to be infertile, and advance judicial approval of the agree-
ment (but not opt out provision) for the contract to be enforceable. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
160(B), 20-160(B)(8) (Michie 1995).
[Vol. 48:825
1999] ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 849
A few years later, a California court ruled on the validity of "tradi-
tional surrogacy" contracts in California.216 First, the court distin-
guished traditional surrogacy from an earlier California Supreme
Court case addressing "gestational surrogacy. '217 The court relied on
the California Family Code requirement that consent for adoption be
given in the presence of a licensed social worker.218 The court rea-
soned that because traditional surrogacy contracts necessarily are en-
tered into before the child is born, they could not comply with the
California Family Code provision.219 Consequently, traditional surro-
gacy contracts are invalid in California.220 Of course, a voluntary re-
linquishment of parental rights by the mother after the child's birth, in
compliance with the family code, would be permitted because the ele-
ments of a statutory adoption would be satisfied.221
The settled common law provides that traditional surrogacy con-
tracts are invalid or unenforceable. Slight unsettling of the common
law occurred in the 1998 Connecticut Supreme Court case of Doe v.
Doe.222 The couple's advertisement for a surrogate in their local
newspaper resulted in a woman's agreement to serve as their surro-
gate.223 Of consequence was the fact that the surrogate was also mar-
ried and living with her husband at the time.224
Not a couple to waste perfectly good medical insurance premiums,
John Doe frequently accompanied the surrogate to her pre-natal doc-
216. In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 1994).
217. Gestational surrogacy contracts were addressed in Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.
1993). Gestational surrogacy involves the IVF of husband's sperm with wife's egg which is then
grown into an embryo. This embryo is then implanted in another woman's womb who gestates
the child under the terms of the contract, and is generally paid for her services. The gestational
mother, therefore, is not genetically related to the child. Id. at 777-78. The court also distin-
guished cases where a sperm supplier (ambiguously referred to as a sperm "donor") asserts
parental rights as in Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 531 (Ct. App. 1986). Here, as in
the traditional surrogacy contract, the baby is genetically related to the sperm supplier. Id. at
532-33. The issue becomes whether the sperm "donor" was a true donor in that donation implies
relinquishment of any rights such as what occurs when the source of sperm is a sperm bank.
Indeed, direct donation of semen can be sticky in more than one way.
218. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8814 (West 1994).
219. Id.
220. Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894-95. The traditional surrogate contract
child is the product of the intended father and the unintended mother, and genetically related to
both.
221. Id. at 894.
222. 710 A.2d 1297 (Conn. 1998). Jane, having had three previous children in another country
and a subsequent tubal ligation, met John. Id. at 1302. Together they decided to have a child.
Id. A tubal reconstruction re-anastomosis procedure was unsuccessful and Jane's pregnancy via
usual means was not possible. Id.
223. Id. at 1302. After the price was agreed upon, John and Jane inseminated the surrogate at
her house, using a syringe filled with John's semen. Id.
224. Id. at 1303.
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tor visits where the surrogate assumed Jane Doe's identity, using
Jane's name and social security number.225 Upon admission to the
hospital for delivery, the surrogate identified herself as Jane and the
birth certificate indicated Jane's name as the mother.226 True to her
bargain, the surrogate delivered the baby to John and Jane upon leav-
ing the hospital, never to bother the couple again.22 7
The apparently successful ruse terminated when Jane filed for di-
vorce and requested custody of the now fourteen-year-old child.22 8
John countered with the uncontested fact that Jane was not the ge-
netic mother and that Jane had never adopted the child.2 29 The trial
court held that the child was not an issue of the marriage and thus it
had no subject matter jurisdiction to determine the custody dispute. 230
To complicate matters, the surrogate was married and living with
her husband during the course of the pregnancy and delivery.231 Con-
necticut law provides that a child born to a married woman living with
her husband is a presumed child of the (surrogate's) marriage.2 32 The
trial court concluded that this presumption had not been rebutted by
the requisite clear and convincing evidence.2 33 At that point, it ap-
peared that neither John nor Jane could be declared the child's legal
parent. 234
After the trial court's ruling that the child was not a child of John
and Jane's marriage, John brought a motion in probate court to be
declared the child's father and to sever any (now uncontested) paren-
tal rights of the surrogate and her former husband. 235 This motion
was granted by the probate court.236 The trial court subsequently
ruled that it, the trial court, did not have jurisdiction to decide custody
and thereby accepted the probate court's action. 237 Thus, the trial
court recognized the child's custody to be with the father by default.238
On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed and concluded
that the trial court did have subject matter jurisdiction over the cus-
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Doe, 710 A.2d at 1302.
229. Id. at 1301.
230. Id. at 1303.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. (citing Schaffer v. Schaffer, 445 A.2d 589 (1982)).
234. Doe, 710 A.2d at 1303.
235. Id. at 1304.
236. Id. at 1303.
237. Id. at 1300.
238. Id. at 1303.
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tody matter. 239 Further, the court found the statutory presumption of
a child's best interest to be with the natural parent did not apply.2
40
The case was remanded back to the trial court for a determination of
child custody solely based on the best interests of the child.241 While
specifying that Connecticut's equitable parent doctrine did not apply
to the facts of this case, the court strongly suggested that the wife
should receive custody of the child. 242 This, of course, is exactly the
application of the equitable parent doctrine.
This case suggests that the invalidity of traditional surrogacy con-
tracts does not preclude the non-gestational, non-genetically related
wife from gaining custody of the child.243 This is, indeed, new law.
The court here suggested that the best interests of the child test
trumps all common law and statutory law.244 Evidently, the court
would vest complete equity power in the trial courts regarding child
custody regardless of whether the child was an issue of the marriage.
That same year, the Connecticut Supreme Court rendered another
controversial holding. In Doe v. Roe,245 the court ruled on whether
the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to render judgment in
accordance with a stipulated agreement reached in the probate
court.246 That post-baby birth settlement agreement included a prom-
ise by the traditional surrogate mother to consent to the termination
of her parental rights for additional consideration over that which was
provided in the traditional surrogate contract.247
Here, a traditional surrogacy contract between a husband and a sur-
rogate resulted in the birth of a healthy baby girl.248 Four months
later, the surrogate mother filed a motion for habeas corpus, in pro-
bate court, seeking custody of the child.249 She also filed for declara-
tory judgment, requesting a determination that the surrogacy contract
was void as both against public policy and as a coercive contract
239. Id. at 1300.
240. Doe, 710 A.2d at 1306-07.
241. Id. at 1324. While the court stated that Connecticut's equitable parent doctrine would
not apply to these facts, the court remanded suggesting that joint custody would be in the best
interests of the child. Id.
242. Id.
243. The courts in Baby M and Moschetta held surrogacy contracts invalid or unenforceable
and implied that genetic relationships controlled with the non-gestational wife having no paren-
tal rights notwithstanding the intention of the parties at the time of contract. These cases suggest
that intention coupled with time can prevail over established common law.
244. Doe, 710 A.2d at 1324.
245. 717 A.2d 706 (Conn. 1998).
246. Id. at 708.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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signed under duress and false pretenses. 250 The father counter-
claimed, asking the court for specific performance of the surrogacy
contract. 251 During the course of the litigation, a settlement was
reached in which the surrogate mother agreed to relinquish her paren-
tal rights for additional consideration.252 The probate court accepted
the settlement agreement, terminated the surrogate's parental rights,
and authorized the beginning of proceedings for step-parent
adoption.253
Because the surrogate refused to sign the adoption papers or relin-
quish custody of the child eight months later, the husband and wife
filed a motion asking the court to hold the surrogate in contempt for
failing to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement. 254 The
surrogate countered with a motion requesting the court to declare the
agreement to be a nullity as based on a void surrogacy contract. 255
Ultimately, the Connecticut Supreme Court determined that the
lower court had jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and
to order its specific enforcement. 256 This case suggests that if a surro-
gate sues to invalidate a traditional surrogacy contract, it would be
prudent for the husband and wife party to delay the case until the
baby's birth. After the birth of the baby, a surrogate's judicially ac-
cepted settlement providing for the "voluntary" termination of her pa-
rental rights (in consideration for more money, of course) would be
enforced and husband and wife would become the legal parents.
Thus, even though a traditional surrogacy contract would be unen-
forceable, the effect of enforcement may be attained through a settle-
ment agreement, which will likely include more than just the original
pecuniary consideration. This apparently does not violate the prohibi-
tion against "buying a baby" adoption laws.257 The Connecticut
courts will view this type of settlement as a valid accord and satisfac-
tion of a disputed claim. The critical difference is the post-birth settle-
ment agreement compared to the pre-birth surrogacy contract.
250. Id.
251. Doe, 717 A.2d at 708.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 709.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 711.
257. See Surrogate Parenting Assoc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 1986).
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B. Gestational Surrogacy Contracts
Gestational surrogacy differs significantly from traditional surro-
gacy.258 In gestational surrogacy, an ovum is fertilized with sperm in
vitro.259 The zygote is grown into an eight cell (or more) organism
(embryo) where it is either placed into the uterus of a woman unre-
lated to the gamete providers, or frozen for such future use. The ges-
tational surrogacy contract occurs between the couple desiring to
bring a child into the world and the uterus provider who is genetically
unrelated to the embryo. The gestational surrogate provides the incu-
bator facilitating the development (gestation) of another man and
woman's genetic child.260
California's landmark case of Johnson v. Calvert261 was the first to
address the enforceability of gestational surrogacy contracts. Crispina
Calvert underwent a hysterectomy a few weeks prior to her marriage
to husband Mark.262 Mark and Crispina both desired to beget their
own child.263 Although without a uterus, Crispina's functioning ova-
ries continued to produce healthy eggs.264 A sympathizing co-worker
of Crispina's mentioned this sad situation to a friend of the co-worker
who suggested that she, the co-worker's friend, could serve as the
couples' surrogate. 265 The gestational surrogacy contract provided
that for a fee, 2 6 6 the surrogate, Ms. Johnson, would have Mark and
258. Because gestational surrogacy is clearly distinguished, in law and in biology, from tradi-
tional surrogacy, authors and legislatures would do well to avoid the generic term "surrogacy."
With the advances in IVF and the proximity of human cloning, gestational surrogacy will become
increasingly common. Gestational surrogacy, and its associated contractual arrangements, will
cease to be an issue only by the advent of an effective artificial uterus.
259. The fertilization occurs in a petri dish (outside the body).
260. Corollaries exist in the animal world. As one example, a genetically unrelated penguin is
driven by instinct to incubate an exposed egg.
261. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
262. Id. at 778.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. Some authors declare that surrogacy contracts are an exploitation of the poor. See,
e.g., G.R. Dunstan, Social and Ethical Aspects, in DEVELOPMENTS IN HUMAN REPRODUCTION
AND THEIR EUGENIC ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 213 (Carter ed., 1983); Erika Hessenthaler, Note:
Gestational Surrogacy: Legal Implications of Reproductive Technology, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 169,
174 n.9 (1995); Katherine B. Lieber, Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist Critique of Surrogacy be
Answered?, 68 IND. L.J. 205 (1992). In the instant case, the fee of $10,000 is calculated to be
$1.45 per hour for 24 hours per day for 40 weeks. The implication is that this "low" payment is
exploitation.
This argument is spurious. Since when is a voluntary, non-coercive, mutually negotiated con-
tract to be adjudged by an outside party as exploitation? Neither party is required to contract.
Is pregnancy a full time occupation? Absent complications, most pregnant women work at their
usual jobs during their pregnancy. Is it not a person's autonomous right to use their body as they
desire (assuming it does not harm others)? Is a college athletic scholarship an exploitation of a
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Crispina's in vitro produced embryo implanted into her uterus, would
carry the fetus to term, and would relinquish all parental rights after
the birth of the child.267
Just before delivery, a dispute arose over the financial terms of the
contract.268 Ms. Johnson threatened to refuse to give up the baby af-
ter the baby was born.269 The Calverts sued to be declared the child's
legal and natural parents.270 Ms. Johnson sued to have the contract
declared to be an unenforceable surrogacy contract.271
The trial court ruled in favor of the Calverts and ordered any paren-
tal rights of Ms. Johnson terminated.272 The apellate court unani-
mously affirmed, holding that a woman who agrees to have a couple's
fertilized egg implanted in her womb is neither the natural nor legal
mother of the child.273 The gamete suppliers were deemed the natural
and legal parents of the child.274 Further, the court held that the sur-
rogate was not deprived of any constitutionally protected interests.275
The California Supreme Court affirmed the holdings of the two
lower courts.2 76 California's Uniform Parentage Act 277 was held inap-
plicable since, under the Act, a woman could claim legal motherhood
by either giving birth or by proving genetic relation to the child with
blood tests.2 78 The court declared that its decision was governed by
the "intent of the efforts of the parents" by which "the child would not
have otherwise been born. '2 79 The court noted that "the parties' aim
person who does not happen to be wealthy? Where is the evidence that only poor women agree
to become surrogates? It appears that this contention of exploitation of poor women is non-
meritorious speculation, at best.
267. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Ct. App. 1991) (appellate court case of Johnson
v. Calvert).
274. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 1993) (act repealed since decision).
278. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781-82.
279. Id. at 883. This reasoning seems a little weak because the intent of the husband and wife
in a traditional surrogacy contract is to bring a child into being. But in a traditional surrogacy
arrangement, the mother is not the intending wife, she is the contractual surrogate.
Since intent exists in both situations, it seems much better to rely on the genetic origins of the
child as controlling. Genetic origin is objective, discoverable, and constant. Reliance on genetic
origin is consistent with the result in traditional surrogacy contracts and with the outcome here.
The Johnson dissent stated that the best interests of the child should control rather than consid-
eration of intent. Id. at 789 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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was to bring Mark and Crispina's child into the world, not for Mark
and Crispina to donate a zygote to the surrogate. '280
The court stated that all the parties realized that a pregnant woman
has a constitutionally protected right to abort any fetus which she is
carrying, consistent with current law.2 81 Any promise abrogating that
right would be unenforceable. 282 Additionally, the court opined that
"gestational surrogacy contracts do not exploit women of lower eco-
nomic status any more than any other poorly paying and undesirable
employment. 2 83 Therefore, "gestational surrogacy contracts are not
unconscionable or coercive as a matter of law."'284
The dissenting justice in Johnson concluded that the satisfaction of
the strong desire to have one's own genetically related child was not
worth the social price of the surrogacy arrangement.285 The dissent
argued to have the case remanded to the trial court where the surro-
gacy contractual dispute would be settled on "the best interests of the
child" basis.286 The dissent cautioned that the magnitude and severity
of public policy considerations demand immediate legislative atten-
tion and action. 287
An Ohio court found the state's statutory birth registration inappli-
cable in a gestational surrogacy arrangement. 288 In Belsito v. Clark,289
the wife had also undergone a hysterectomy just before marriage. 290
Knowing of the couple's yearning to have a child, the wife's sister
agreed to gestate the couples in vitro produced embryo, without com-
pensation.291 As the pregnancy neared term, the couple learned of an
Ohio law providing that if the birth mother is not married to the fa-
ther, the child is officially illegitimate.292 Desperate to avoid stigma-
tizing their child as illegitimate, the genetic mother (wife) and genetic
father (husband) filed a motion requesting a declaratory judgment
finding them to be the legal and natural parents of the soon to arrive
baby.293
280. Id. at 782.
281. Id. at 784.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784.
285. Id. at 800-01 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
286. Id. at 801.
287. Id. California has not yet statutorily addressed gestational surrogacy contracts.
288. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio 1994).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 761.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 762.
293. Id.
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The court found Ohio's birth registration statutes inapplicable in a
gestational surrogacy setting.294 Consistent with Johnson, the Belsito
court noted the gestational mother was genetically unrelated to the
embryo, and that the intent of the genetic providers (husband and
wife) governed whether the child would be brought into being.295 Be-
cause the husband and wife provided the child's genes and because
the husband and wife intended to bring the child into being, the court
held the husband and wife to be the natural and legal parents.296
Therefore, the birth certificate was ordered to so indicate.2 97
Perhaps the ultimate gestational surrogacy contract, involving five
parties, occurred in the case of Buzzanca v. Buzzanca.2 98 In Buz-
zanca, a sterile husband and an infertile wife, desiring a child but
wanting to have some choice over the child's genetic constituency, ob-
tained a donated egg and selected donated sperm for IVF.2 99 The re-
sulting embryo was implanted into the uterus of another woman
serving as a contractual gestational surrogate.300 Thus, neither hus-
band nor wife was genetically related to the embryo derived from an
egg donor and sperm donor. 301 The gamete donors were neither re-
lated to the contracting couple nor to the gestational surrogate.302
Just before the birth of the child, Mr. Buzzanca filed for divorce.30 3
Claiming she and her husband were the child's parents, Mrs. Buzzanca
demanded paternal child support payments.304 Mr. Buzzanca dis-
claimed any paternal responsibility on grounds that he was not geneti-
cally related to the child and that the gestational surrogacy contract
was invalid since it was signed after the pregnancy had commenced.30 5
The surrogate made it clear that her responsibilities were limited to
294. Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 762.
295. Id. at 763. The court here, as in Johnson, specified that the genetic provider's intent is of
such critical significance that without it the baby would not have been born. Id. This intent is
distinguished from the intent of the husband and wife in a traditional surrogacy arrangement
where the wife's position sinks to the level of an intended third party beneficiary of the contract
between the sperm providing husband and the ovum providing surrogate. In a gestational surro-
gacy contract, the gamete providing husband and wife's intent governs whether the embryo will
be created.
296. Id. at 767-68.
297. Id. at 768.
298. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
299. Id. at 282.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282.
305. Id. Recall that under Baby M, the non-genetically related spouse had no claim of
parenthood absent adoption. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (N.J. 1988).
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those of a contractual gestational surrogate. 30 6 The gamete providers
were donors and had relinquished any rights at the time of their gam-
ete donations.30 7
The trial court examined California's Uniform Parentage Act and
determined that parenthood could be established by giving birth or by
genetic relation proven by blood tests.308 Because the Buzzancas
were not genetically related to the child, the gametes were donated
without intent to reserve parental rights and the gestational mother
was only obligated to perform under the terms of the contract.30 9 The
trial court found that the baby was born parentless! 310
On appeal, the appellate court held that, under California common
law, fatherhood could be established if the husband "consented" to
the artificial insemination of his wife.311 The court held the rule perti-
nent to the case at issue.312 Since Mr. Buzzanca consented to the IVF
which was intended to result in a child, he was the lawful father. 313
Uncontested, Mrs. Buzzanca was held to be the child's mother.314 Ac-
cordingly, the child's procreation was the product of a medical proce-
dure initiated by intended parents.315 The court reasoned that, as the
legal father, Mr. Buzzanca was entitled to all the rights and responsi-
bilities of fatherhood, including child support.31 6
C. Statutory Regulation of Surrogacy
Some states have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act ("UPA"), 31 7
which appears to apply to surrogacy contracts. Under the UPA, a par-
ent can be established by either proving a genetic relationship or by
the woman bearing and delivering the child.318 Applying the UPA to
a traditional surrogacy situation, the surrogate and the semen provider
(usually the husband) are the child's mother and father.319 The wife,
since she is neither genetically related nor the birth mother, has no
legal parental status whatsoever. By contrast, in the gestational surro-
306. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 285.
312. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 285.
313. Id. at 286.
314. Id. at 282.
315. Id. at 286.
316. ld.
317. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7700 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999).
318. Id. § 7610.
319. See id.
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gacy contract, both husband and wife are genetically related to the
child, thereby providing the wife with a claim under the UPA.
Presently, only the statutes of Florida specifically address gesta-
tional surrogacy. Florida statutes provide that a gestational surrogacy
contract shall be binding if, inter alia, the surrogate is eighteen years
old, the commissioning couple is legally married, and the commission-
ing mother is physically unable to gestate a pregnancy to term.320
Generally, state statutes addressing surrogacy contracts do not dif-
ferentiate between traditional and gestational surrogacy. Conse-
quently, one is left with the conclusion that these states' use of the
term "surrogacy" applies to traditional surrogacy contracts, but may
or may not apply to gestational surrogacy.
The District of Columbia, 321 Indiana, 322 Michigan, 323 New York,324
North Dakota,325 and Utah326 deny enforcement of all surrogacy con-
320. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(2)(a) (West 1997).
321. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-402 (1997).
Prohibitions and penalties.
(a) Surrogate parenting contracts are prohibited and rendered unenforceable in the
District.
(b) Any person or entity who or which is involved in, or induces, arranges, or other-
wise assists in the formation of a surrogate parenting contract for a fee, compensa-
tion, or other remuneration, or otherwise violates this section, shall be subject to a
civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or
both.
322. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (Michie 1997)
Legislative declarations.
The general assembly declares that it is against public policy to enforce any term of a
surrogate agreement that requires a surrogate to do any of the following:
(1) Provide a gamete to conceive a child.
(2) Become pregnant.
(3) Consent to undergo or undergo an abortion.
(4) Undergo medical or psychological treatment or examination.
(5) Use a substance or engage in activity only in accordance with the demands of an-
other person.
(6) Waive parental rights or duties to a child.
(7) Terminate care, custody, or control of a child.
(8) Consent to a stepparent adoption under IC 31-19 (or IC 31-3-1 before its repeal).
and § 31-20-1-2.
Surrogate agreements void.
A surrogate agreement described in section 1 of this chapter that is formed after March
14, 1988 is void.
323. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West 1993).
Contracts; void and unenforceable.
Sec. 5. A surrogate parentage contract is void and unenforceable as contrary to public
policy.
324. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 22:122 (McKinney 1997).
325. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1997).
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tracts. Kentucky, 32 7 Louisiana, 32 8 Nebraska, 32 9 and Washington 330
Surrogate agreements.
Any agreement in which a woman agrees to become a surrogate or to relinquish that
woman's rights and duties as parent of a child conceived through assisted conception is
void. The surrogate, however, is the mother of a resulting child and the surrogate's
husband, if a party to the agreement, is the father of the child.
326. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1995).
Prohibition of surrogate parenthood agreements-Status of child-Basis of custody.
(a) No person, agency, institution, or intermediary may be a party to a contract for
profit or gain in which a woman agrees to undergo artificial insemination or
other procedures and subsequently terminate her parental rights to a child
born as a result.
(b) No person, agency, institution, or intermediary may facilitate a contract pro-
hibited by Subsection (1). This section does not apply to medical care provided
after conception.
(c) Contracts or agreements entered into in violation of this section are null and
void, and unenforceable as contrary to public policy.
(d) A violation of this subsection is a class B misdemeanor.
(2) An agreement which is entered into, without consideration given, in which a
woman agrees to undergo artificial insemination or other procedures and subse-
quently terminate her parental rights to a child born as a result, is unenforceable.
(3) (a) In any case arising under Subsection (1) or (2), the surrogate mother is the
mother of the child for all legal purposes, and her husband, if she is married, is
the father of the child for all legal purposes.
(b) In any custody issue that may arise under Subsection (1) or (2), the court is not
bound by any of the terms of the contract or agreement but shall make its
custody decision based solely on the best interest of the child.
(4) Nothing in this section prohibits adoptions and adoption services that are in ac-
cordance with the laws of this state.
(5) This section applies to contracts or agreements that are entered into after April 24,
1989.
327. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Michie 1995).
Prohibited acts and practices in adoption of children-Expenses paid by prospective
adoptive parents to be submitted to court.
(1) A person, corporation, or association shall not advertise in any manner that it will
receive children for the purpose of adoption. A newspaper published in the Com-
monwealth of Kentucky or any other publication which is prepared, sold, or distrib-
uted in the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall not contain an advertisement which
solicits children for adoption or solicits the custody of children.
(2) A person, agency, institution, or intermediary shall not sell or purchase or procure
for sale or purchase any child for the purpose of adoption or any other purpose,
including termination of parental rights. This section shall not prohibit a child-
placing agency from charging a fee for adoption services. This section shall not be
construed to prohibit in vitro fertilization. For purposes of this section, "in vitro
fertilization" means the process by which an egg is removed from a woman, and
fertilized in a receptacle by the sperm of the husband of the woman in whose womb
the fertilized egg will thereafter be implanted.
(3) No person, association, or organization, other than the cabinet or a child-placing
institution or agency shall place a child or act as intermediary in the placement of a
child for adoption or otherwise, except in the home of a stepparent, grandparent,
sister, brother, aunt, or uncle, or upon written approval of the secretary. This sub-
section shall not be construed to limit the Cabinet for Human Resources in carry-
ing out its Aid to Dependent Children Program in accordance with KRS Chapter
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deny enforcement only if the surrogate is to be compensated. Nota-
bly, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled in Surrogate Parenting Associ-
205. This section shall not be construed to prohibit private independent adoption
or the right to seek legal services relating to a private independent adoption.
(4) A person, agency, institution, or intermediary shall not be a party to a contract or
agreement which would compensate a woman for her artificial insemination and
subsequent termination of parental rights to a child born as a result of that artificial
insemination. A person, agency, institution, or intermediary shall not receive com-
pensation for the facilitation of contracts or agreements as proscribed by this sub-
section. Contracts or agreements entered into in violation of this subsection shall
be void.
(5) A person, organization, group, agency, or any legal entity, except a child-placing
agency, shall not accept any fee for bringing the adoptive parents together with the
child to be adopted or the biological parents of the child to be adopted. This sec-
tion shall not interfere with the legitimate practice of law by an attorney.
(6) (a) In every adoption proceeding, the expenses paid, including but not limited to
any fees for legal services, placement services, and expenses of the biological
parent or parents, by the prospective adoptive parents for any purpose related
to the adoption shall be submitted to the court, supported by an affidavit, set-
ting forth in detail a listing of expenses for the court's approval or modification.
(b) In the event the court modifies the expense request as it relates to legal fees
and legal expenses only, the attorney for the adoptive parents shall not have
any claim against the adoptive parents for the amount not approved.
328. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West 1991).
Contract for surrogate motherhood; nullity.
A. A contract for surrogate motherhood as defined herein shall be absolutely null and
shall be void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy.
B. "Contract for surrogate motherhood" means any agreement whereby a person not
married to the contributor of the sperm agrees for valuable consideration to be
inseminated, to carry any resulting fetus to birth, and then to relinquish to the con-
tributor of the sperm the custody and all rights and obligations to the child.
329. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1995).
Contract; void and unenforceable; definition.
(1) A surrogate parenthood contract entered into shall be void and unenforceable.
The biological father of a child born pursuant to such a contract shall have all the
rights and obligations imposed by law with respect to such child.
(2) For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires, a surrogate
parenthood contract shall mean a contract by which a woman is to be compensated
for bearing a child of a man who is not her husband.
330. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.230 (West 1997)
Surrogate parenting - Compensation prohibited.
No person, organization, or agency shall enter into, induce, arrange, procure, or other-
wise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage contract, written or unwritten, for
compensation.
and § 26.26.240
Surrogate parenting - Contract for compensation void.
A surrogate parentage contract entered into for compensation, whether executed in the
state of Washington or in another jurisdiction, shall be void and unenforceable in the
state of Washington as contrary to public policy.
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ates v. Commonwealth331 that compensated surrogate parenting
contracts were enforceable. 332 The Kentucky legislature responded by
passing a bill providing for the unenforceability of compensated surro-
gacy arrangements. 333
Florida,334 Nevada,335 New Hampshire, 336 and Virginia 337 statutes
specifically provide that unpaid surrogacy contracts are lawful and en-
331. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986) (providing these contracts did not violate the law prohibiting
the selling the babies).
332. Id. at 213-14.
333. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Michie 1995).
334. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 1997) (gestational surrogacy contract).
335. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045 (Michie 1998).
Contract requirements; treatment of intended parents as natural parents; unlawful acts.
1. Two persons whose marriage is valid under chapter 122 of NRS may enter into a
contract with a surrogate for assisted conception. Any such contract must contain
provisions which specify the respective rights of each party, including:
(a) Parentage of the child;
(b) Custody of the child in the event of a change of circumstances; and
(c) The respective responsibilities and liabilities of the contracting parties.
2. A person identified as an intended parent in a contract described in subsection 1
must be treated in law as a natural parent under all circumstances.
3. It is unlawful to pay or offer, to pay money or anything of value to the surrogate
except for the medical and necessary living expenses related to the birth of the child
as specified in the contract.
4. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Assisted conception" means a pregnancy resulting when an egg and sperm
from the intended parents are placed in a surrogate through the intervention of
medical technology.
(b) "Intended parents" means a man and woman, married to each other, who enter
into an agreement providing that they will be the parents of a child born to a
surrogate through assisted conception.
(c) "Surrogate" means an adult woman who enters into an agreement to bear a
child conceived through assisted conception for the intended parents.
336. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
Regulatory Procedures.
I. A surrogate arrangement is lawful only if it conforms to the requirements of this
subdivision, and if, before the procedure to impregnate the surrogate:
(a) The health care provider performing the procedure receives written certifica-
tion that the parties successfully completed the medical and nonmedical eval-
uations and counseling pursuant to RSA 168-B:18 and 19;
(b) The surrogate arrangement has been judicially preauthorized pursuant to
RSA 168-B:23; and
(c) All parties to the surrogacy contract provide the health care provider per-
forming the procedure with written indication of their informed consent to
the arrangement.
II. The procedure to impregnate a surrogate shall be performed only in accordance
with rules adopted by the department of health and human services.
III. No woman shall be a surrogate, unless the woman has been medically evaluated
and the results, documented in accordance with rules adopted by the division of
department of health and human services, demonstrate the medical acceptability
of the woman to be a surrogate.
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forceable. All require that the intended mother must be infertile.
Additionally, New Hampshire 338 and Virginia 339 require advance judi-
cial approval of the surrogacy agreement and limit who may act as a
surrogate.
Arkansas law presumes that a child born to a surrogate mother is
the child of the intended parents and not the surrogate. 340 Therefore,
Arkansas law presumes the validity of surrogacy contracts.
D. Involuntary Surrogacy
The misappropriation of embryos at University of California, Ir-
vine's Center for Reproductive Health resulted in the unwitting gesta-
tion of genetically unrelated embryos.341 Three fertility expert
physicians342 intentionally implanted non-genetically related embryos
(frozen for future use of the genetic owners) into at least sixty non-
consenting women who thought they were being implanted with ge-
netically related embryos fertilized from their ova and their husbands'
IV. No person or entity shall promote or in any other way solicit or induce for a fee,
commission or other valuable consideration, or with the intent or expectation of
receiving the same, any party or parties to enter into a surrogacy arrangement.
337. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-159, 10-160(b)(4) (Michie 1995).
Surrogacy contracts permissible.
A. A surrogate, her husband, if any, and prospective intended parents may enter into a
written agreement whereby the surrogate may relinquish all her rights and duties as
parent of a child conceived through assisted conception, and the intended parents
may become the parents of the child as provided in subsection D or E of § 20-158.
B. Surrogacy contracts shall be approved by the court as provided in § 20-160. How-
ever, any surrogacy contract that has not been approved by the court shall be gov-
erned by the provisions of §§ 20-156 through 20-159 and §§ 20-162 through 20-165
including the provisions for reformation in conformance with this chapter as pro-
vided in § 20-162.
338. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:21 (1994).
Petition for Preauthorization Hearing.
I. Prior to insemination, in vitro fertilization or preembryo trandfer of a surrogate, the
parties to a surrogacy contract, as specified in RSA 168-B:25, shall jointly petition
the court for judicial preauthorization of the surrogacy arrangement.
339. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-159(B) (Michie 1998).
340. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1998).
341. See Fertility Doctor Says Partners Knew of Thefts, Eggs Were Taken From Patients of U. C.
Clinic, SAN DIEcO UNION & TRIB., Mar. 19, 1998, at A3. Drs. Ricardo Asch, Jose Balmaceda,
and Sergio Stone were all preeminent scientists in the infertility area. Id. Drs. Asch and
Balmaceda fled to Chile and Mexico after the closing of the clinic. Id. Both are currently prac-
ticing infertility medicine. Id. Dr. Stone remained in the United States where he was subject to
a prosecution for fraud. Id.
342. Id.
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sperm.343 These misappropriations of embryos occurred during the
period of 1988 to 1995.344
As evidence of these embryo thefts became apparent, the Orange
County District Attorney refused to criminally charge these physi-
cians with felony theft because felony theft in California requires the
conversion of property with a value over $400. 345 The prosecutor re-
fused to characterize embryos as property and refused to place a dol-
lar value on an embryo.346 Consequently, no criminal charges were
brought against these physicians.347
The question of legal parenthood became an issue because several
babies were born to mothers gestating embryos owned by and in-
tended for other couples. 348 Under California's statutory Uniform
Parentage Act, a mother can claim maternal rights by delivering her
child.349 The California Supreme Court determined that maternity
can also be established by proving a genetic relationship to the child
as well. 350 Although the birth mothers in these cases are not geneti-
cally related to the child, the woman qualifies for legal status because
she has gestated the child.
The birth mother's husband, however, cannot claim parentage
under the Act since he is not genetically related to the baby. The
absence of paternity (genetic fatherhood) may be proven with blood
tests.351 Although the husband is not genetically related to the child,
under the California Family Code, a husband cohabiting with his wife
is the presumed father of a child delivered by his wife.352 Thus, the
wife's husband has a presumptive paternal status.
343. Tracy Weber & Julie Marquis, Fertility Doctors Face New Suit, L.A. TIMES (Orange
County ed.), May 26, 1995 at 1.
344. Id.
345. Id. .
346. Id.
347. Id. As a result of the prosecutor's refusal to file criminal charges, California Senator
Tom Hayden sponsored Senate Bill 1555 making the misappropriation of gametic material or the
unconsented implantation of non-genetically related gametic material a felony in California.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 367(g) (West Supp. 1999).
348. Id.
349. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610 (West Supp. 1994).
Method of Establishment.
The parent and child relationship may be established as follows:
(a) Between a child and the natural mother, it may be established by proof of her
having given birth to the child.
350. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 779 (Cal. 1993).
351. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999) (providing for blood testing to prove
genetic paternity).
352. Id. § 7611.
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In Johnson v. Calvert,353 the California Supreme Court held that a
child may only have one mother.354 When two women are able to
establish maternity under the Uniform Parentage Act, the law will de-
clare the natural and legal mother to be the woman who "intended to
bring about the birth of [the] child [and] raise [it] as her own. '355 The
Johnson court reiterated that the natural and legal mother is the
woman who "intended to procreate the child-that is, she who in-
tended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as
her own. '356
The obvious question in these cases is, did the birth mother intend
to "procreate" this child and intend to raise this child as her own? To
''procreate" can mean either to propagate (bring forth offspring) or to
reproduce (implied genetic reproduction). Until recently, biologi-
cally, to propagate and to reproduce were synonymous. Clearly the
birth mother intended to gestate and raise her own embryo. By impli-
cation, can one conclude that since this did not happen, the birth
mother is not the intended mother and thus loses a dispute over ma-
ternity with the genetic mother?
Application of the "intent" test of Johnson leads to the conclusion
that the birth mother did not intend to procreate this particular non-
genetically related child. The birth mother's intent was to bear and
give birth to her own genetically related child, which the child in these
circumstances clearly was not.
The providers of the gametic sources, the genetic mother and father
of the embryo, who thought their embryo was still frozen awaiting
their own personal use, have a maternal and paternal claim under the
Uniform Parentage Act provable by blood tests. Their intentions
were to bear this child sometime in the future. Should the fact that
another woman unwittingly and unintentionally gestated their embryo
deprive them of their genetically related child? The application of
Johnson would likely result in the genetic parents' rights trumping the
(involuntary) gestational surrogate's rights. Johnson, however, would
likely be distinguished because it involved a consensual gestational
surrogacy contract.
Should it make any difference how old the child is when the genetic
facts are discovered? 357 In cases of inadvertent baby switching at hos-
pitals, the age of the child is a factor courts consider in deciding
353. 851 P.2d 776.
354. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 779 (Cal. 1993).
355. Id. at 782.
356. Id.
357. Id.
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whether to change the custody of the child. Involuntary surrogacy can
be analogized to these switched children cases. In both situations, the
child taken home from the hospital is neither genetically related to the
gestating (birth) mother, nor genetically related to her husband. Intu-
itively, it seems that the "best interests of the child" considerations of
inadvertent "switching" custody disputes should be applied to cases
of involuntary surrogacy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
ART scientific advances afford increasing procreational opportuni-
ties to the United States' one in six couples likely to require infertility
services at some point in their lives. Sperm storage, sperm sex selec-
tion, ova storage, IVF, and embryo cryopreservation now enable fam-
ily planning options which would have been considered fantasy only a
couple decades ago. The opportunities also portend huge oscillation
in our society involving not only when to have children, but what chil-
dren to have. The necessarily reactive common law courts are subject
to being trumped by reactionary interested factions, such as religious
zealots, who have demonstrated increasing influence upon legislators
who are mandated to make informed, well-reasoned public policy. If
past is prologue, however, our constitutional protections will trump
the special interests' constraints sanctioning reasonably unimpeded
scientific progress in ART.
Nonetheless, the Authors strongly believe that new, uniform legisla-
tion needs to be created which takes into account the rapidly advanc-
ing science of ART. At a minimum, this legislation should strive to
develop consistency between the legal and biological definitions of the
elements and procedures of ART.
The proposed legislation must also distinguish between the various
ART techniques and regulate them accordingly. For example, as dis-
cussed in this Article, only Florida has passed legislation which distin-
guishes between gestational and traditional surrogacy arrangements,
despite the significant biological differences between the two ART
procedures. 358 Thus, it is the Authors' belief that the goal of achieving
uniformity and consistency in the regulation of the science of ART
will also require legislative recognition of the differences in the biol-
ogy of the various ART procedures.
358.. One couple, Basilio and Loretta Jorge, former patients of the UCI fertility clinic, have
commenced a fight for legal and physical custody of their seven year old genetically related
children (actually twins) born to a couple receiving infertility treatment at the clinic. Fertility
Patients Seek Custody of Twins, DAILY NEWS, Feb. 19, 1996, at A4.
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Perhaps the single greatest obstacle to any proposed uniform ART
legislation is the significant moral and ethical issues that necessarily
arise as a result of the science itself. These issues come in many di-
verse forms. Presently, there is no legislation governing the rights of
embryo adoption, and only the state of Louisiana has passed laws reg-
ulating embryo destruction.
It also seems as though news reports of multiple births (e.g., seven
and eight children) to a single couple as a result of the "success" of
ART is becoming more commonplace. 359 Is it possible to have ten
children or more as a result of ART? How many is too many? Who
will pay for the disastrous medical consequences of these multiple
births? Undoubtedly, any legislation attempting to tackle the science
of ART will be met with stern resistance from various special interest
groups. The question then becomes: Is it better to leave such issues
purposefully unresolved because they are political "hot potatoes"?
The Authors believe the answer to that question is a resounding no.
The science of ART will continue to advance and so too must the
regulation of the technology.
359. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(2)(a) (West 1997).
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